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OPTIMAL GROUNDWATER MINING IN THE OGALLALA AQUIFER: 
ESTIMATION OF ECONOMIC LOSSES AND EXCESSIVE 
DEPLETION DUE TO COMMONALITY 
ABSTRACT 
The optimal rates of intertemporal and within-group groundwater 
mining in the Ogallala Aquifer are estimated for the year 1985 to 2005 . 
The gains realized by the optimal policy are measured and compared with 
gains from the free market policy and life of the aquifer is estimated. 
OPTIMAL GROUNDWATER MINING IN ~HE OGALLALA AQUIFER: 
ESTIMATION OF ECONOMIC LOSSES AND EXCESSIVE 
DEPLETION DUE TO COMMONALITY 
The chief aim of this paper is to derive optimal rates of ground-
water mining over time in the southern portion of the Ogallala Aquifer, 
and to measure the gains realized by the optimal policy. The Ogallala 
is a groundwater aquifer extending from north of the Nebraska and South 
Dakota border to the southern edge of the Texas Panhandle. The study 
area consists of Bailey, Castro, Crosby, Floyd, Hale, Hockely, Lamb, 
Lubbock, Lynn, and Parmer counties in Texas and Curry and Roosevelt 
counties in New Mexico. This group of counties has been identified as 
a single watershed of the Brazos River Basin. In this area the water 
table has been falling because the amount of water that recharges the 
aquifer is small relative to the withdrawals. Falling water stocks and 
rising energy prices are threatening the ~gricultural economy. How to 
control and conserve the limited groundwater stock is crucial in the 
region. The fact that groundwater is a common property resource like 
ocean fisheries complicates management. Without an appropriate agree-
ment or regulation by all users of the resources, market forces lead to 
the over-exploitation of the resources and this results in welfare loss. 
The objective of this paper is to estimate optimal rates of ground-
water mining over time with deposits of different grades under alterna-
tive levels of energy and crop prices, and to measure economic losses 
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and excessive depletion due to commonality. In the second section a 
model for optimal groundwater mining allocation over time is presented. 
It is compared with the allocation in a free market model in the third 
section. Iq the fourth section numerical solutions are given and eval-
uated. Summary and conclusions are presented in the final section. 
Optimal Groundwater Mining Model 
The exploitation of common property resources with reference to 
groundwater has been discussed by Milliman. The paper by Burt, Cummings, 
and McFarland estimated the steady state stock in the Estancia Valley of 
New Mexico but ignored the commonality problem governing allocations of 
groundwater, Also, the model does not include the impact of rising en-
ergy price on irrigation productions. 
In this paper a control model is developed to provide the optimal 
rates of groundwater mining over time under alternative levels of energy 
and crop prices and to measure economic losses and excessive depletion 
due to commonality. We assume that there are n different resource sit-
uations which form a common pool, and each resource situation has dif-
ferent pumping lifts and land fertilities. We also assume that the mar-
ket is atomistic so that each producer is a price-taker. 
The problem is to find an optimal path [Ui, i = 1, 2, .... ,n] such 
thaL the time-discounted net present joirt-profit of all producers is 
maximized subject to an equation of motion. The problem can be form-
ulated as follows: 
~ 
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U.(t) is the control variable which represent the amount of water applied 
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in the ith resource situation. Di(t) is the state variable which describes 
the depth to water in the ith resource situation. CP and EP are the c~op 
and energy price index, respectively. tis time (o, l, ... ,T). NRii is 
the net return for irrigation farming in the ith water situation, and de-
fined as: 
where P is the price of crops, fi is the production function in the ith 
r esource situation and Ci is the pumping and production cost in the ith 
resource situation. 
. 1 
D represents the time rate of change of the depth 
to water . a 0 and a 1 are the nonnegative coefficients of the equation 
(1). Equation (1) is an equation of motion which expresses the physical 
r e lation of intertemporal and within-group water uses and stocks. Equa-
tions (2) and (3) represent the nonnegatility constraint for the amount 
of wa ter used and the depth to water, respectively. 
The problem (A) can be solved by the Maximum Principle (Intriligator 
and Kirk). Let A(t) be a co-state variable or a shadow price associated 
with the equation of motion, (1). 
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Let ~.(t) be the shadow price associ-
1 
ated with the constraint (2). One of the necessary conditions for maxi-
mization is ~s follows: 
so that: 
The left-hand side of the equation (8) is the marginal value pro-
duct of water (flow). The right-hand side of equation (8) is divided 
into three parts: C.u. is the marginal cost of water, - ~0 ·A·ert is a 1 1 
user cost or an opportunity cost which implies the value of profits fore-
gone in future periods due to an increase in water utilization, and 
rt 
- ~.·e is the boundary cost associated with the nonnegativity constraint 
1 . 
of ui. Ignoring the boundary cost, the optimal rate of groundwater use 
is the rate at which the marginal value product equals the sum of the 
marginal cost and the user cost (U in Figure 1) for all n water situa-
s 
tions. The result is identical with that in the literature (Milliman 
and Cummings) . 
Social Optimal Versus Free Market Model 
The model described in the previous section is the centralized, 
controlled or social optimal model. It implies the control of the en-
tire stock is concentrated in a single decision maker or alternatively 
there is no horizontal movement of water between adjacent properties. 
The profit of all users who share the common aquifer is maximized by 
5 
recognizing the finite nature of stock being exploited and the inter-
temporal effects of decisions. 
Without regulations by the central authority or the agreement by 
all users , each user extracts water so as to maximize his own profit. 
This is the free market or unregulated model. In this case each user 
exploits resources at the point where the marginal value product equals 
the marginal exploitation cost (at Uf in Figure 1), and if the entry to 
industry (pumping groundwater) is free then each user exploits more re-
sources until the point is reached where the marginal value product 
equals the average exploitation cost. 
Application 
Groundwater mining model described in the second section is applied 
to the southern portion of the Ogallala Aquifer for the years 1985 to 
2005 . The study area is projected to include about eight million acres 
of total land and four million acres of cropland in 1990 (Short et al.). 
The major crops currently produced are grain sorghum, cotton, wheat, and 
corn. This area depends heavily on groundwater, and irrigation farming 
has been developed intensively and the problem of water table decline 
i s serious. 
The area using water from the Ogallala Aquifer is broken into four 
water situations defined according to denth to water . The land is also 
divided into two classes according to different management possibilities 
and yield potentials. The total irrigation land is classified into 
eight classes by the combination of the water situation and the land 
class, and each classification is called a "resource situation." 
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Net returns for irrigation and dryland farming are obtained by using 
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a linear programming model with a parametric technique. They are used 
to estimate the net return functions. The estimated functions (by least 
squares fitting of a quadratic) are summarized in Table 1. In addition, 
they are modified by using the development of crop yield coefficients4, 
since they do not include the time trend of net returns due to technical 
change. The equation of motion (the water relation equation) is derived 
from the technical relation of groundwater inflow and outflow: · 
where 
feet, 
D j 
t 
u j 
t 
( 9) 
6 8 . . 
= 2.5 * 10- * E [U J *A J] - 0.4278 
j=l t t 
is the depth to water in the jth resource situation in time t, 
is the amount of water applied per acre in the jth resource 
situation in time t, feet, and Atj is the irrigated acreage in the jth 
resource situation, acre . 
Since we do not have the continuous data, the model described in 
the second section, (A), is transformed to the discrete-time finite-
horizon model. In getting the results, five scenarios are employed . 
Scenarios A, B, and C represent the normal, low, and high price levels 
of both energy and crops, respectively. Scenario D incorporates the low 
energy price and the high crop price, and finally Scenario E incorporates 
the high energy price and the low crop price. 
The free market solution has a shorter life of the aquifer than the 
social optimal solution (Table 2) since the former has no regulation on 
j 
j 
s 
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water use and utilizes more water for all periods. The aquifer has a 
shorcer life with the high discount rate or the high crop price. Under 
Scenario E the dryland production is more profitable than irrigation and 
hence no groundwater is pumped. Table 3 reports the optimal level of 
the annual per-acre water use by resource situations for the five scen-
arios. For the social optimal solution the better resource situations 
such as resource situation one (less than 50 feet of the depth to water 
in land class 1) and five (less than 50 feet of the depth to water in 
land class 2) have the higher level of per-acre water use while worse 
resource situations such as four (more than 200 feet of the depth to 
water in land class 1) and eight (more than 200 feet of the depth to 
water in land class 2) have no water use or lower per-acre water use. 
The better the resource situation the higher the marginal productivity 
and the lower the marginal cost. The comparison of the social optimal 
to the free market solution tells us that the latter always has a higher 
rate of water use for both total and per-acre use than the former solu-
tion. The over-utilization and early-depletion of the water resource 
is obvious under the free market model. 
Groundwater belongs to the common property resource and therefore 
an inefficient water allocation results without regulations by the cen-
tral authority or agreements by all users of groundwater. Only if all 
users of water try to maximize their joint net return subject to water 
relation constraints, will the optimal intertemporal and within-group 
allocation be realized. The social optimal solution in this paper im-
8 
plies this joint benefit maximization problem, while the free market 
solution represents the outcome from each user's own benefit maximiza-
tion problem. The gains realized from the social optimal policy and the 
free market policy, which include both the net farm income and the con-
servation of groundwater resources, are presented in Table 4. With the 
free market policy the region will make losses of a 50 million to 1.11 
billion dollars in net farm income and a 3.8 to 19.5 foot decline of the 
depth to water under Scenarios A, C, and D. There is a loss in the con-
servation of the depth to water under Scenario B. No changes occur un-
der Scenario E since all lands are used as drylands. The size of losses 
depends on the level of energy and crop prices and the level of the dis-
count rate. The free market policy, however, provides clear losses to 
the agricultural economy of the region. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Making use of the model developed in this paper the optimal rates 
of intertemporal and within-group groundwater mining in a portion of the 
Ogallala Aquifer are estimated for the years 1985 to 2005, and losses 
due to commonality are measured. 
It has been shown that: (1) the better the resource situation the 
higher the optimal rate of water use, (2) the higher the discount rate 
the greater the optimal rate of water us:, (3) the higher the energy 
price the longer the economic life of the groundwater aquifer and the 
smaller the farm income, and (4) the higher the crop price the shorter 
the economic life of the aquifer and the greater the farm income. The 
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free market policy evidently furnishes losses to the agricultural econ-
omy of the region in both net income and groundwater conservation. At 
normal levels of the energy and the crop price, commonality provides a 
60 million dollars of the net farm income and a 10.4 foot of the ground-
water depletion. 
Footnotes 
!/A dot above the variable indicates the time rate of change of 
that variable, e.g . , D = dx/dt. 
1/Partial derivatives of function of several variables are expressed 
by the function with a subscript, e.g., f =a f/o and f = a2f/ou2 . 
u u uu 
3/ 
- Short et al. have completed the economic study on the Ogallala 
Aquifer using a regional, recursive, linear programming model . The model 
allows us to estimate the net return functions. 
i/The total yield functions for irrigation and dryland cropping 
are estimated, respectively: 0.9663073 + 0.0067385t and 0.9723593 + 
0.0055286t where t is years after 1985. 
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Table 1. Estimated Net a Return Functions for Irrigation and Dryland Farming 
Irrigation: NRI Dry: NRD 
Intercept -372.0722 -215.4881 
D -0.4673 (0.025)b 
CP 340.7572 (27.896) 241.2301 (39.067) 
EP -73.4388 (8.324) 
D*EP -0.0397 (0.014) 
U*CP 35.3584 (8.568) 
U*EP 13 . 7574 (2.810) 
U*U -27 . 3139 (4.399) 
CP*CP -29.31.00 (6.767) -29.4853 (13. 637) 
EP*EP 3. 1228 (1.202) - 1.7426 (0.532) 
Xl 245.6387 (3.452) 97.6060 (4.527) 
2c 
R 0.991 0.968 
MSEd 155.185 216.073 
aVariable definition: NRI = net return per acre for irrigation 
farming, dollars; NRD = the net return per acre for dryland farming, 
dollars; D = the depth to water, feet; U = the amount of water applied 
per acre in a given year, feet; cp • the crop price ind~; EP = the 
energy price index; Xl = the dummy variable for land class ane. 
bFigures in the parentheses are standard errors. 
c 2 R is the coefficient of determination. 
~E is the mean square error. 
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MC + User Cost 
MC 
us uf u 
Figure 1. The equilibrium for the social optimal and the free 
market model 
Table 2. Life of the groundwater aquifer for the five scenarios 
Years Before De:Eletion 
Scenario Social Optimal Solution Free Market Solution 
5% Discount Rate 
A 24 20 
B 99 82 
c 16 14 
D 10 7 
E 0 0 
15% Discount Rate 
A 21 20 
B' 91 82 
c 15 14 
D 8 7 
E 0 0 
Table 3. a Annual per-acre water use for the five scenarios with 5% discount rate 
Annual Per-acre Water Use (feet) 
Social Optimal Solution Free Market Solution 
Resource 
Scenario Situation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1985 1985 
A 1. 26 1.19 1.03 - - - - - 1.32 1.32 1.32 
B 0.54 0.48 
- - - - - - 0.60 0.60 0.60 
c 1.82 1. 75 1.56 - - - - - 1.88 1.88 1.88 
D 1.32 1. 26 1.12 0.76 1.34 1.32 - - 1.38 1.38 1.38 1.38 1.38 1.38 
E 
2005 2005 ~ N 
A 1.39 1.34 1.19 - - - - - 1.44 1.44 1.44 
B 0.61 0.56 - - - - - - 0.66 0.66 0.66 
2000 1998 
c 1.95 1.89 1. 73 - - - - - 1. 99 1.99 1.99 
1994 1991 
D 1.40 1.35 1.20 0.85 1.42 1.40 - - 1.43 1. 43 1.43 1.43 1.43 1.43 
a For simplicity, levels of annual per-acre water use are listed only for the initial year (1985) and terminal 
year (1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, and 2005). 
Table 4. A Comparison of the Social Optimal Solution to the Free Market Solution 
Scenario 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
Social Optimal {S) 
Total Net Total Net 
Farm Present Value 
Income of Farm Income 
5% Discount Rate 
11.24 7.10 
2. 75 1.71 
16.02 10.21 
18.61 12.09 
2.08 1.28 
15% Discount Rate 
11.23 3.74 
2.75 0.88 
15.95 5.44 
17.92 6.58 
2.08 0.65 
Free Market (F) 
Total Net Total Net 
Farm Present Value 
Income of Farm Income 
Economic Losses (S-F) 
Total Net Total Net 
Farm Present Value 
Income of Farmincome 
(billions of year 1985 dollars) 
11.18 7.08 0.06 0.02 
2.75 1.71 
15.88 10.15 0.14 0.06 
17.50 11.48 1.11 0.61 
2.08 1.28 
11.18 3.73 0.05 0.01 
2.75 0.88 
15.88 5.43 0.07 0. 01 
17.50 6.47 0.42 0.11 
2.08 0.65 
Excessive 
Depletion of 
Water Stock Due 
a to Commonality 
(feet) 
10.4 
1.8 
7.9b 
19.5c 
3.8 
0.7 
2.9b 
7.0c 
aThe total decline of the wa t e r table for the free market solution minus that for the social solution. 
b The difference is calculated for 14 years (1985-1998). 
c The difference is calculated for 7 years (1985-1991). 
f-' 
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